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The Mereology of Digital Copyright*
Dan L. Burk†
INTRODUCTION
The development of the Internet as a means of communication
has facilitated widespread access to a vast array of digitized works
in a variety of electronic formats.1 Increased access to such
digitized works has heightened the need for robust systems that can
identify and index online resources in order to allow users to locate
and access the new wealth of digitized materials in what amounts
to a global virtual library.2 Cataloging and indexing has always
been critical to library functions, but never more so than in the
decentralized, emergent library that constitutes the Internet.3
Consequently, search engines such as the Google4 database have
developed into key tools for facilitating access to online resources;
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1
See Paula Samuelson, Fair Use for Computer Programs and Other Copyrightable
Works in Digital Form: The Implications of Sony, Galoob and Sega, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L.
49, 108 n.246 (1993).
2
See Eric Goldman, Search Engine Bias and the Demise of Search Engine
Utopianism, 8 YALE J. L. & TECH. 188, 189 (2006).
3
See Lucas D. Introna & Helen Nissenbaum, Shaping the Web: Why the Politics of
Search Engines Matters, 16 INFO. SOC’Y 169, 170 (2000).
4
Google Home Page, http://www.google.com (last visited Jan. 2, 2008).
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if the resource is not indexed via such a database, it effectively
ceases to exist.5
Such control over access to digital resources implicates control
over the use and disposition of those resources.6 Information
cannot be used until it is found. In the physical world, control of
information has been incident to physical or legal ownership that
determines access or exclusion. Works of creative authorship have
long been subject to ownership under the rubric of copyright law,
which offers certain defined exclusive rights as an incentive for
creation and publication of expressive works.7 However, the
copyright system that developed in a world of hardcopy print is
challenged both by the technology of digitization and by the
construction of metadata indexes for digitized works.8 Rules of
ownership developed to control access to atoms apply only
uncertainly when used to control access to bits.9
The troubled interplay between copyright and digital
expression is nowhere more apparent than in the controversial
Google Book Search10 project, where search engine technology
intersects with indexed databases scanned into electronic format
from hardcopy materials.11 In this Article, I analyze the copyright
status of this project, using it as a vehicle to develop certain themes
that are emerging as fundamental issues in the copyright of
digitized texts. I begin by describing the Google Book Search
project, touching briefly upon the legal rationale relied upon by
Google for scanning copyrighted works into its database without
permission of the copyright holders. I then move to the issue that
has received less attention: the copyright status of the metadata
relational database that is core of the project. This database, I
argue, is emblematic of the broader issues facing copyright in an
age of digitization, and I discuss several cases that bear upon the
5

See Introna, supra note 3, at 171.
See id. at 169–75.
7
17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2000).
8
See Emily Anne Proskine, Google’s Technicolor Dreamcoat: A Copyright Analysis
of the Google Book Search Library Project, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 213, 213 (2006).
9
See id.
10
Google Book Search, http://books.google.com (last visited Jan. 2, 2008).
11
About Google Books, http://books.google.com/intl/en/googlebooks/about.html (last
visited Jan. 2, 2008).
6
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legal status of such a meta-database. I conclude by sketching the
challenges that copyright law will need to encompass as works of
authorship move from fixation as atoms to recordation as bits.
THE GOOGLE BOOK PROJECT
The Google Book Search project is an ambitious—even
audacious—attempt to make available via the Internet a searchable
database of texts previously available only as bound, printed
matter.12 The project uses Google search engine technology as the
technical vehicle to provide storage, indexing, and retrieval of texts
that have been scanned from printed format to digital format.13
But the scanning process requires access to the physical printed
texts. This has been accomplished via two complementary
initiatives.14 The first of these initiatives is the relatively
straightforward “publisher program.”15 In this component of their
overall strategy, Google seeks the cooperation and permission of
publishers for inclusion of books in the database, and many
publishers see value in participating. Publishers in this part of the
program provide copies of books to be scanned or, if available,
they provide electronic files of book text, under terms agreed upon
with the publisher.16 This portion of the overall Google agenda is
relatively uncontroversial; scanning and inclusion of books within
this portion of the database is done with permission and approval
of the publishers, who generally hold the copyright, and who can
set whatever terms of use they choose.17
What has been more controversial is the library scanning
portion of the Google effort. In this portion of the project, Google

12
See Jonathan Band, The Google Print Library Project: Fair or Foul?, 9 J. INTERNET
L. 1, 1 (2005).
13
See id.
14
See id.
15
Partner Program, https://books.google.com/partner/?hl=en_US (last visited Jan. 2,
2008); see also Book Search Intro, http://books.google.com/intl/en-US/googlebooks/
book_search_tour/index.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2008).
16
Help Users Find Your Books, http://books.google.com/googlebooks/book_search_
tour/books2.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2008).
17
See Band, supra note 12.
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has entered into agreements with several libraries,18 including
those of Harvard University, the University of Michigan, the New
York Public Library, and Oxford University, to gain access to and
to scan all or part of the library’s holdings.19 The exact terms of
the agreements are undisclosed and appear to differ from library to
library, but it is clear that at least some of these agreements will
result in scanning of books for which the library owns the physical
volume, but for which the library does not have the right to make
or authorize making of copies, including scanned digital copies.20
In both portions of the project, book pages are scanned to
produce high quality, but not archival quality, images.21 The
scanned images are then parsed by Google search technology.22 At
present, Google is keeping the original images stored, and has
agreed to provide copies of the original images back to the library
from which the book was scanned.23 But the stored images
18

Library Partners, http://books.google.com/googlebooks/partners.html (last visited
Jan. 2, 2008).
19
Id.
20
See Can I see a copy of a contract you have with a library partner?, Google Book
Search Help Center, http://books.google.com/support/bin/answer.py?answer=43752&
query=contracts (last visited Jan. 2, 2008); Suzanne Bresson Bis, Book Search Is
Beautiful?: An Analysis of Whether Google Book Search Violates International
Copyright Law, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 271, 281 (2007).
21
“If you look at what Google does, it’s really a bitonal representation. It’s as if the
book were brand new, which is just to say that the page is white [and] the ink for the font
is black. Whereas if you look at the Microsoft [Windows Live Book Search]
presentation, it’s a color image, so you get the sense of it as an artifact.” Dian
Schaffhauser, Google Book Search: The Good, the Bad, & the Ugly, Campus
Technology, Jan. 1, 2008, at 7, available at http://www.campustechnology.com/
articles/57064 (quoting Linda Becker, Vice President, Marketing for Kirtas, a digitization
technology solutions company). Google has not released any specific information about
the exact scanning system it uses for the Book Search project. Its engineering director,
Dan Clancy, has stated that the company developed its own scanning process rather than
use a commercial scanning solution. Id. at 4–6.
22
The digitization process involves the parsing of the scanned image and converting
that information into “other file formats for online viewing.” Id. at 7. Therefore a user
can “just enter the keyword or phrase . . . into the Google Book Search box” and Google
will return “snippets—of [the] search term in context.” How does Google Book Search
work?, Google Book Search Help Center, http://books.google.com/support/bin/
answer.py?answer=43724&topic=9259 (last visited Jan. 15, 2008).
23
“[T]he library will get a digital copy of the book as a part of their collection.”
Information
for
publishers and
authors
about
the
Library
Project,
http://books.google.com/googlebooks/publisher_library.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2008).
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themselves are not the database from which users search or from
which search results are returned.24 Rather, a relational database
built up from the scanned images is the core of the project. An
index is built of each word in the scanned text and its relationship
to nearby words. This relational database is made available via a
user interface on the Google website.25 When a user searches the
database using keywords, a snippet of the text comprising the
keyword sought and a certain number of surrounding words is
returned.26 If a book is deemed to be in the public domain, the full
text may be made available; if the book is still in copyright, the
availability of text is restricted.27 Rather than providing full text
access for most books in the library program, Google provides,
along with the search results, links to bookstores or libraries where
the physical book may be purchased or borrowed.
Although access to the reconstructed text is parsimonious, the
mere scanning of the books to produce the relational database has
created a firestorm of controversy.28 The holdings of any of these
libraries will certainly include both works currently protected by
copyright and works for which the copyright has lapsed or
expired.29 The latter type of work may of course be copied freely,
but it will often be difficult to determine which category a
particular work falls into. Google has argued that obtaining
permission to scan the books would be prohibitive—even
determining whether permission is needed would be prohibitive.30
Prior to 1978, copyright in the United States was granted for a term

24

As stated above, Google has disclosed little information about its search technology.
See Schaffhauser, supra note 21. I rely here in part on conversations with personnel at
Google.
25
See How does Google Book Search work?, Google Book Search Help Center,
http://books.google.com/support/bin/answer.py?answer=43724&topic=9259 (last visited
Jan. 15, 2008)
26
See id.
27
See Why can’t I read the entire book?, Google Book Search Help Center,
http://books.google.com/support/bin/answer.py?answer=43729&topic=9259 (last visited
Jan. 15, 2008).
28
See Band, supra note 12, at 12.
29
See id. at 1.
30
See Proskine, supra note 8, at 219.
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of years, with renewable extension.31 Some authors may have
failed to renew the copyright for the extended term, in which case
the work may have fallen into the public domain and may be
copied freely—but it will often be difficult to determine whether a
work was renewed.32 Additionally, since the early 1990s, U.S.
copyright law has not required that a copyright notice be placed on
published works.33 Prior to that time, publication of a work
without notice automatically placed it into the public domain, so
that lack of a notice signaled that the work could be freely
copied.34 This is no longer a requirement for published works, so
more recently published works that are protected by copyright may
have no indication of who held the copyright when the work was
published.35
And, the complexity of determining a book’s copyright status
does not end there. Copyright may have been transferred to an
entity other than the author or publisher; publishers may have gone
out of business; authors may be deceased; the heirs of authors, who
may or may not have inherited the copyright to the work, may be
difficult or impossible to locate. Consequently, the cost of simply
locating the copyright holders of many books, in order to obtain
permission for their works to be scanned into the database, is
potentially enormous.36 Naturally, if copyright holders for the
books can be located, some may decline permission to scan the
book, diminishing the usefulness of the resultant database with
each permission denied. But such refusals are a relatively simple
and straightforward problem; it is equally likely that copyright
owners, once located, could demand idiosyncratic fees or place
restrictions on the use of the scanned work—the cost of such fees,
as well as the cost of negotiating such permissions, would further
add to the expense of creating the database.
31

See Copyright Act of 1909, § 23, available at http://www.copyright.gov/history/
1909act.pdf .
32
See Library of Congress Copyright Office, How to investigate the copyright status of
a work, Circular 22 (2004), http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ22.pdf.
33
17 U.S.C. § 401, amended by The Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-568 (Oct. 31, 1988).
34
See Copyright Act of 1909, § 1.
35
See Notice of Copyright, supra note 33.
36
See Proskine, supra note 8, at 219.
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This scenario appears to threaten the prospect of an “anticommons” that might stifle the development of a comprehensive
book database, whether compiled by Google or by anyone else.37
Typically, property rights are allocated to prevent the so-called
“tragedy of the commons,” where resources are misallocated
because no one is motivated by ownership interests to maintain the
resource.38 But an “anti-commons” can potentially occur in
situations where permissions from multiple property holders are
necessary to complete a project and where the transactions cost of
obtaining such permissions becomes prohibitive—that is, where
there are too many property rights and rights holders, rather than
too few.39
Google has attempted to solve this problem by moving ahead
with the scanning of books, but giving publishers and authors the
option of requesting that their work not be scanned into the
database.40 This approach effectively shifts the burden of
determining and asserting exclusive rights to copyright holders,
requiring them to come forward and “opt out” of the project.41
Copyright holders have complained that this approach
impermissibly inverts the basic exclusivity premise of intellectual
property: that copying is prohibited unless authorized.42 However,
the Google “opt out” procedure operates from the premise that
Google has the right to copy the works, but as a courtesy will
refrain from doing so if asked.43 Much of the legal controversy to
date over the Google “opt out” assertion has focused upon

37

See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition
from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 661 (1998).
38
See id. at 677.
39
See id.
40
See What about books that I don’t want in Google Book Search at all?, Google Book
Search Help Center, http://books.google.com/support/bin/answer.py?answer=43755&
topic=9011 (last visited Jan. 15, 2008). Partners can upload a list of books to be excluded
while others must participate in Google’s opt-out process. Id.; see also Library Exclusion
List
Upload
Instructions,
Google
Book
Search
Help
Center,
http://books.google.com/support/partner/bin/answer.py?answer=44050 (last visited Jan.
15, 2008); Library Project Exclusion Registration, https://books.google.com/partner/
exclusion-signup?hl=en_US (last visited Jan. 15, 2008).
41
See Band, supra note 12, at 12.
42
See id.
43
See id. at 14.
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determining how Google could claim to be in a position to make
copies without obtaining advance copyright permission.44
The legal justification for Google’s opt-out position rests
largely upon the American doctrine of fair use, a highly flexible,
fact-specific exception to the rights of copyright holders.45 Most
countries have within their copyright law a series of privileges and
exceptions that allow the users of copyrighted works to engage in
unauthorized activities that would otherwise violate the rights of
the copyright owner: quoting a protected work for news reporting,
reproducing a work for educational purpose, or certain other
activities socially beneficial activities.46 But the United States, in
addition to a list of such exceptions, also permits unauthorized uses
on a case by case basis, depending upon the amount of protected
expression taken, the type of work from which it is taken, the
purpose to which it is put, and the effect of the unauthorized
activity upon the market for the original work.47
This U.S. exception to the exclusive rights of copyright holders
has been explained by some commentators as a solution to the
problem of high transaction costs.48 This theory of “fair use as
market failure” argues that fair use is necessary when the
transaction costs of reaching agreement on authorized use is too
high—when the copyright owner cannot be easily found, or
demands a fee in excess of the value of the use, or the negotiations
are protracted and cumbersome, and so on.49 In such cases, the
44

See, e.g., Edward Wyatt, Ruling May Undercut Google in Fight Over Its Book Scans,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/25/technology/
25google.html (speculating as to whether a relevant ruling against the creation of
thumbails from copyrighted images undermines the legality of Google’s “opt-out”
policy); see also Publishers Sue Google Over Plans To Digitize Books, Association of
American Publishers (Oct. 19, 2005), http://publishers.org/main/PressCenter/Archicves/
2005_Oct/Oct_03.htm; Authors Guild Sues Google, Citing “Massive Copyright
Infringement”, The Authors Guild (Sept. 20, 2005), http://www.authorsguild.org/
news/sues_google_citing.htm.
45
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2007).
46
See Band, supra note 12, at 14.
47
See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
48
Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis
of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1601 (1982); Lydia
Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era of
Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (1997).
49
Gordon, supra note 48, at 1618; Loren, supra note 48, at 33 n.140.
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law permits the user to circumvent the negotiation process and
move ahead with the use, effectively taking a compulsory license
at a zero royalty.50 Often this will occur in the case of minor, de
minimis uses, where the value of the use is relatively low relative
to the costs of search, negotiation, and so on. But it could also
occur when the value of the use is high and aggregate search costs
are prohibitive, as in the anti-commons scenario.51
Several U.S. cases have held that producing a temporary or
intermediate copy, which is produced in the process of developing
a product different than the copyrighted work, and which is then
discarded, or at least which is not part of the product eventually
marketed to the public, is a fair use. For example, courts have
repeatedly held that a copy of software made in the process of
decompiling the software for reverse engineering, in order to
produce an interoperable complimentary product, or even a
competing product, is fair.52 The copy made is temporary—it is
made in order to extract unprotected information about
functionality, the result is a different product altogether, and the
intermediate copy is not part of the product marketed to the
public.53 A similar analysis has been applied to extracting public
domain artworks from a copyrighted publication.54
This same rationale might be applied to the Google Book
Search database. The scanned images are unnecessary to the final
product—although images are being provided to the partner
libraries, they can be discarded. They are not the end product that
is to be offered to the public; rather, they are a mechanism or
vehicle for creating the end product, which is the searchable
database. The database is transformative, that is, it is not at all the
50

See Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 121, 133
(1999).
51
See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition
from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 624 (1998); see also Burk, supra note 50,
at 158 & n.185.
52
Samuelson, supra note 1, at 87–88 (discussing Sega Enters., Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc.,
977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992), Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., 975 F.2d 832
(Fed. Cir. 1992), and MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computers, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir.
1993)).
53
Samuelson, supra note 1, at 66.
54
Id. at 117–18.
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same as, or a substitute for, the copyrighted works employed in its
creation.55 What is being offered to the public is more than the
sum of the scanned images—Google has added value by
disaggregating and indexing the texts to make the relations
between individual words searchable. The database has value all
its own, but its production would be impossible without the step of
scanning the images.56
At the same time, it might be argued that the market that is
undermined by the use of the copyrighted works is the market for
use of the works in databases. This is in fact a source of complaint
about paying for permission to use individual works in the creation
of the database.57 Some previous copyright decisions suggest that
in cases where a mechanism for licensing and payment of licensing
royalties exists, the market potentially harmed by a fair use is the
market for that particular use.58 This argument may be unavailing
in the context of the Google project; previous cases relying on this
rationale involve photocopying periodicals when payment for such
photocopies could be made through an existing mechanism. For
example, cases holding that photocopying of materials for
university course packets, or for archival reference, were based
upon the existence of a mechanism for paying copy-licensing fees
via the Copyright Clearance Center, which would distribute
copying royalties to the owners of the works.59 But we have
already seen that in the case of the Google project, many of the
books to be scanned are “orphan” works for which the copyright
status is uncertain, and the possible copyright owner unknown.
Consequently, it is unclear whether development of an effective
licensing and payment mechanism is possible.
These considerations make Google’s fair use position at least
tenable, and perhaps even decisive in the United States—but
reliance on this U.S. doctrine has prompted Google to restrict Book

55

See Loren, supra note 48, at 30.
See Band, supra note 12, at 11.
57
Id. at 13.
58
See generally Loren, supra note 48, at 27–49 (analyzing recent case law).
59
Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1381 (6th Cir.
1996).
56
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Search access to Internet users in the United States.60 Even with
regard to U.S. law, such aspects of the Google project are
fascinating and critically important. But they have already
received some treatment elsewhere, and are likely to be the subject
of further analysis and critique.61 For the discussion here, they are
necessary primarily as a backdrop to a different set of issues that
are foregrounded in the Google project, but which are endemic to
digital copyright. Here I wish to focus upon the more fundamental
and potentially far-reaching problem of ownership over metadata
in digitized works.
This analysis centers on the database that Google is building
from the scanned texts, rather than the act of scanning images. The
database appears to consist of words and of metadata defining the
relationship between those words.62 A given word will typically
be too short to satisfy the requirements of originality and creativity
for copyright;63 only creative expression that originates with an
author is eligible for copyright protection.64 And even in the rare
case where a word might qualify as original, it will likely fail
copyright’s “merger” doctrine: fundamental to the law of copyright
is the principle that it protects only original expression, and never
the idea that is expressed.65 If there is only a single way, or very
limited number of ways to express an idea, those expressive
choices are excluded from copyright, since including them would
be tantamount to protecting the idea itself.66
Thus, as a matter of black-letter copyright law, it would appear
that words are not protected by copyright, so no book publisher or
author can claim copyright infringement of individual words.67
But more troubling is the status of the meta-database that records
the relationship between those words. The question I consider
there, then, is whether Google has created an infringing copy of
copyrighted books by building a database that allows
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67

Band, supra note 12, at 14.
Id. at 14.
Proskine, supra note 8, at 217.
Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967).
Feist Publications, Inc., v. Rural Telephone Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006).
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006).
See id.
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disaggregated words to be re-assembled into the text of those
books.
DEFINING DIGITAL COPIES
The first question in determining whether Google’s database
infringes the copyright in the scanned book texts is whether
Google has made a copy for purposes of the copyright statute.
Somewhat surprisingly, the first answer to this question of
disaggregated copyrightable works was perhaps first apparent back
to the beginning of the 20th Century, with the advent of automated
player pianos, which played popular songs from paper rolls in
which the music was coded as punched holes.68 Music composers
objected that such piano rolls—precursors to the punch cards on
which computer data was later stored—when made without their
permission infringed the copyright in their musical compositions.69
But the United States Supreme Court held that such piano rolls did
not fall under the copyright statute, but were rather a piece of a
machine that produced music, akin to a cog or toothed wheel in a
music box.70 Machines and other functional devices are not
covered by copyright; if covered by intellectual property law at all,
they belong to the patent system.71 Consequently, the encoding of
copyrighted music as punched holes was held not to constitute a
violation of the copyright.72
Congress responded to this decision, and to the ensuing distress
of music composers, by creating a new category of copyrightable
work, the phonorecord, intended to bring sound recordings within
the Copyright Act.73 More important than player piano rolls, the
category of phonorecords also encompassed the phonograph record
in which sounds were recorded as grooves in vinyl discs—a
critically important format for the distribution of popular music.74

68
69
70
71
72
73
74

See White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 9 (1907).
Id. at 9–11.
Id. at 18.
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
White-Smith, 209 U.S. at 18.
Copyright Act of 1909, supra note 31, at § 5.
See Dan L. Burk, Patenting Speech, 79 TEX. L. REV. 99, 127 (2000).
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In fact, this category of copyrightable fixation would eventually
extend to encoding of music in a series of successive technological
media: the magnetic flux of reel-to-reel, eight-track and cassette
tapes, as well as the optical pits of compact discs.75 Since each of
these formats, as well as other new media such as videotape, could
be considered parts of a machine in the same sense as a player
piano roll, Congress also amended the statutory definition of
copies to include both those media “now known or later
developed”76 from which the work could be perceived by a human
being unaided, and from which perception of a work required the
aid of a machine.77
The media “later developed” to instantiate copyrightable works
of course came to include digital media, perceived with the aid of a
computer—the logical successors to the player piano roll.78 Coinoperated video arcade games were among the earliest digitized
works considered under this provision. The popularity of these
games during the 1970s and 1980s led to unauthorized “knockoffs” of the most popular games, and to copyright suits against the
copyists.79 Game developers had registered videotapes of the
game displays with the federal Copyright Office as proof of
ownership. But copyists argued that registration of the game
displays did not satisfy the requirements for copyright because the
game output was not fixed in the circuits that generated the
display—what was fixed was a computer program that produced
the output, but the two were separable.80 As evidence that the
display was unfixed, the copyists pointed out that the game display
changed each time the game was played, in response to player
input. In a related argument, the copyists pointed out that no copy
of the work was contained in the chips; rather, the work was
generated or developed from instructions programmed into the
chip.81 A variety of instructions or programs might produce the
75

Id. at 127.
Copyright Act of 1909, supra note 31, at § 26.
77
Id.
78
Burk, supra note 74, at 127.
79
See, e.g., Stern Elec. Co. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855 (2d Cir. 1982); Williams
Elec., Inc. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 873 (3d Cir. 1982).
80
Stern, 669 F.2d at 855.
81
Williams, 685 F.2d at 877.
76
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same output, and registration of the display should not entitle the
copyright holder to every set of instructions producing such a
display.82
In cases such as Stern Electronics Co. v. Kaufman83 and
Williams Electronics v. Artic International, Inc.,84 the courts
rejected such arguments on the basis of the statutory definition,
holding that if the work was fixed in the game’s semiconductor
chip and could be perceived with the aid of a machine then it must
be a statutory copy. But under this holding, “perceive” must
implicitly include generation or re-assembly of a work. The
pattern of voltages in a chip or the pattern of magnetic flux on a
disc are both profoundly and subtly different from the grooves of a
vinyl phonograph record. Such analog recordings use one physical
quantity to represent another. Consequently, analog media
maintain some relationship within the record of a work
corresponding to the relationships within the work itself. Digital
records need not maintain such analogous relationships, but are
instead series of sequences of bits that can be read to re-construct
the work.85 While the digital version of the work is in some sense
a record of the work, it is not a recording of the work as found in
previous media.
Thus, unlike a microform reader which simply amplifies
human perception, computer code constitutes a set of instructions
for generating the work perceived—but the courts held that
perception of output implied existence of a digital copy.86 As a
corollary, these cases also skirted the contested definitional lines
between “data” and “software”—a sequence of bits containing the
instructions to generate music or text, and a sequence of bits
constituting the record of digitized music or text appear to be
treated identically under these opinions.87 The Stern and Williams
courts were likely less concerned with the technicalities of digital
processing than they were with the end product of the process—an
82
83
84
85
86
87

Stern, 669 F.2d at 855.
Id. at 856.
Williams, 685 F.2d at 877.
Stern, 669 F.2d at 855–56; Williams, 685 F.2d at 874.
Stern, 669 F.2d at 857; Williams, 685 F.2d at 873–74.
Stern, 669 F.2d at 855; Williams, 685 F.2d at 871.

BURK_022508_FINAL

2008]

2/25/2008 7:20:03 PM

THE MEREOLOGY OF DIGITAL COPYRIGHT

725

audiovisual work that, to all appearances, fell within copyright’s
statutory subject matter—and with developing a plausible social
policy for such end products.88 Consequently, these early gaming
cases proved pivotal to establishing the copyrightability of
computer programs, but their implications for storage of digital
copies may not be consistent with more recent decisions, such as
those discussed below.
NEW YORK TIMES CO. V. TASINI
The relationship between the arrangement of text in hardcopy
materials and arrangement of digitized texts within a database was
central to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in New
York Times Co. v. Tasini.89 The Tasini case involved infringement
claims by independently contracted or freelance writers who had
licensed stories to a wide variety of periodical publications:
newspapers and magazines including the New York Times, Time
magazine, and Newsday.90 Many of these hardcopy periodicals
had, since licensing or purchasing the freelance stories, begun
making their contents available in searchable full-text electronic
format.91 Some periodicals developed online databases, while
others provided their contents on CD-ROM or similar electronic
formats.92 Because the licenses or copyright transfers from the
authors were executed before electronic versions of periodicals
became common, the transfers did not address publication of the
stories in databases or other electronic formats.93 Consequently,
the authors claimed that inclusion of their stories in electronic
formats was an unauthorized re-publication of their work, for
which no rights had been granted to the periodical publishers.94
In defense, the publishers relied upon § 201 of the copyright
statute,95 which both establishes copyright in collective works and
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95

Stern, 669 F.2d at 855; Williams, 685 F.2d at 877.
533 U.S. 483, 506 (2001).
Id. at 490.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
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distinguishes such copyright from that in the individual
contributions to a collective work.96 Under this section of the
statute, copyright may subsist in the original selection and
arrangement of copyrighted works in a collective work, such as an
anthology.97 This copyright in the collective work is separate and
distinct from the copyright in any given work included in the
collective work—copyright in the constituent works need not be
transferred to the author or complier of a collective work.98 The
holder of the collective work copyright is limited in the subsequent
uses to which she may put the individual works comprising the
collective work.99 Absent transfer of the copyright in the
constituent works, the holder of the collective work copyright may
use the constituent works only in a revision or re-issue of the initial
collective work.100
The publishers argued that the databases constituted a
“revision” of the hardcopy periodical issues in which articles
originally appeared, and that therefore the publishers had the right
to include the articles in the database collections.101 But, this
defense was rejected by the Supreme Court, which held that the
periodical databases or electronic versions of the periodicals were
not equivalent to the print versions.102 The Court reasoned that the
articles in the databases had been disaggregated from their
sequence and relationship in the print edition.103 Because the
articles were no longer in the context of their original publication,
but rather divorced of their print media relationships, the § 201
revisioning privilege did not apply.104
The Court rejected the contention that the electronic and CD
databases contained the original periodicals despite the fact that
articles retrieved in searches would display the pagination and
publication markings of the periodical in which they were
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104

17 U.S.C. § 201 (2000).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 485 (2001).
See id. at 484.
See id. at 486.
See id.
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originally published.105 The Court held that such indicia were
indicative of the article having previously appeared in the
periodical, but were not indicative of the article as retrieved being
part of the periodical.106 Rather, the articles were better thought of
as components of a super-compendium or library consisting of all
the disaggregated articles, and such a super-compendium was not
equivalent to the original periodical.107 The Court specifically
rejected an analogy to microform records, as microforms, unlike
electronic databases, recorded the original sequence of the
periodicals.108 The court also rejected the argument that because
the users of the databases could re-assemble the articles into the
original sequence, that the database was a revision of the original
periodicals, anymore than a hardcopy library from which a patron
could retrieve and re-assemble a periodical sequence would be a
“revision” of those periodicals.109
MATTHEW BENDER & CO. V. WEST PUBLISHING CO.
A similar set of issues is found in copyright cases considering
the protectability of relationships within the compiled text of
volumes of judicial opinions. The development of legal research
databases from these opinions occasioned the disputes in such
cases, when West Publishing Company attempted to prevent rival
database publishers from adopting a standardized case citation
format.110 West Publishing was and remains the major publisher
of bound, hardcopy volumes of judicial reports, collecting the
judicial opinions from essentially every jurisdiction in the United
States.111 While some jurisdictions published their own reporters,
in many instances the West reporter volumes were the only judicial
reporters for certain jurisdictions.
105

See id. at 485.
Id.
107
See id.
108
See id. at 485–86.
109
See id. at 486.
110
See generally Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ’g Co. (West), 158 F.3d 693 (2d
Cir. 1998).
111
Company Overview, Thompson West, http://west.thomson.com/overview (last
visited Nov. 16, 2007) [hereinafter Thompson West].
106
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Consequently, citation to the West reporter volumes became
effectively an industry standard: anyone practicing in the legal
profession used citations to the West bound hardcopy reports, not
only in office documents and memoranda, but in official
documents filed with the court system.112 Law students across the
United States were trained to use West citations as an essential
component of their professional preparation.113 Judicial opinions
routinely used West citations.114 Indeed, many courts required
attorneys practicing before them to use West citations in motions
and briefs, and allowed the use of no other system, because the
West reporter volumes were most commonly available to judges
searching for, and citing to, judicial precedent.115
With the advent of electronic storage and retrieval systems
containing searchable, full text versions of judicial opinions, West
transferred its reporter volume text to electronic format.116 West’s
subscription database, Westlaw, used the “star pagination” system,
which inserted into the electronic text of opinions numerical
markers corresponding to the location of pages in the bound
hardcopy reporter volumes.117 A rival legal publisher provided a
competing product made up of judicial opinions on CD-ROM discs
that could be accessed by a purchaser’s own machine, rather than
via on-line database access.118 The text of these opinions on CDROM included “star pagination” markers relating judicial opinion
text to the published West reporter volumes—without such
citations to the West volumes the electronic databases would be
essentially useless to lawyers and other legal professionals.119
However, West sued to prevent its competitors from using such
pagination markers, arguing that appropriation of the star
pagination citations was essentially appropriation of their
published volumes—arguing, in other words, that such markers,
indicating the position of text in the published volumes, mapped
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119

Id.
Id.
See West, 158 F.3d at 696.
See id.
See Thompson West, supra note 111.
See West, 158 F.3d at 695.
See id.
See id.
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onto the published volume in such a way as to effectively
constitute a copy of the hardcopy book.120 According to West, the
CD-ROM discs comprised “copies” of the West reporter volumes
because the selection and arrangement of cases in the West
reporters could be perceived with the aid of a machine by use of
the star pagination markers.121 In other words, by following the
star pagination markers, a user could employ the automated
functions of the CD-ROM to view or print cases in the same order
found in the bound West reporter volumes, and this meant that the
CD-ROMs contained copies of the West volumes.122 West also
argued that the layout, selection, and arrangement of opinions in
the published volumes constituted original, copyrighted
expression.123 Hence, under this theory, use of “star pagination”
markers constituted copying of the protected West volumes.124
This citation infringement argument was striking because West
advanced no argument that copying the content of the volumes was
an infringement—it hardly could, because in the United States, by
statute, federal government documents, including federal judicial
opinions, cannot be copyrighted and lie in the public domain.125
Many state government documents receive similar treatment,
meaning that most of the text at issue in West’s claims was
unquestionably unprotected by copyright. Neither did they argue
that the layout of the judicial opinion text was directly
appropriated—formatting and layout was not captured in early
electronic text databases, which was indeed what made the star
pagination system of markers necessary.126 Rather, West’s
argument was that citation that indicated the position of
information—essentially what would come to be called
metadata—was protected by their copyright.127
120

See id. at 695–96.
See id.
122
See id.
123
See id. at 700.
124
See id.
125
See id. at 698.
126
West claimed that Bender’s product allowed users to “to view (and print) judicial
opinions in the same order in which they are printed in a West volume,” not that it copied
West’s publications. Id. at 697.
127
“West’s alternative argument is that even though the page numbering is not (by
itself) a protectable element of West’s compilation, (i) plaintiffs’ star pagination to
121
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As an initial matter, the court declined to find any significant
expression in the editing, selection, and arrangement of opinions in
the West reporters—the court found that West chronologically
published all the opinions made available, with only routine and
minimal editing.128 The court rejected the copying argument,
holding that offering the capability to re-generate the West
volumes was not equivalent to offering copies of the West
volumes.129 The sequence of page breaks signified by star
pagination was not itself original, as it was created by a mechanical
typesetting process, and not by any creative selection and
arrangement of West’s.130 Moreover, even though star pagination
markers might reveal to a reader how the West arrangement could
be recreated, that arrangement was not fixed in the CD-ROM
disc.131 Only manipulation of the data by a user would produce the
West volume case sequence, and the products of user manipulation
were copies fixed in the discs.132 Distinguishing the video game
cases such as Stern,133 the court reasoned that adopting West’s
argument regarding fixation would effectively extend West’s
copyright to all arrangements or re-arrangements that could be
generated by a user, and West was not entitled to control usergenerated arrangements.134
MICRO STAR V. FORMGEN, INC.
The copyright status of metadata descriptions has also been
considered by the Ninth Circuit in Micro Star v. FormGen Inc.135
West’s case reporters embeds West’s arrangement of cases in plaintiffs’ CD-ROM discs,
thereby allowing a user to perceive West’s protected arrangement through the plaintiffs’
file-retrieval programs, and (ii) that under the Copyright Act’s definition of ‘copies,’ 17
U.S.C. § 101, a work that allows the perception of a protectable element of a compilation
through the aid of a machine amounts to a copy of the compilation.” Id. at 700.
128
See id. at 705.
129
See id. at 704.
130
See id. at 705.
131
See id. at 703.
132
See id.
133
See id. at 704; see generally Stern Elec. Co. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir.
1982) (discussion supra).
134
See West, 158 F.3d at 703.
135
154 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1998).
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The dispute in that case centered on advanced playing levels for
the computer game “Duke Nukem 3-D.”136 The game developer,
FormGen, made available to its users the tools to develop alternate
game levels and encouraged the sharing of such user-created game
files on its web site.137 The advanced or alternate game versions
existed as “MAP” files, or sets of game instructions, that could
draw upon a graphic library of character and object images
provided with the game itself, but which would sequence, arrange,
and display the library images in such a way as to provide a more
challenging game experience.138 In the opinion, the court
compared such MAP files to “paint by number” instructions that
tell where to place graphics from the library.139 The library of
graphics itself was not traded or distributed with the MAP files;
rather, it was part of the game purchased by users from
FormGen.140 Thus, the MAP files operated together with other
components with the Duke Nukem game, but could not themselves
independently generate game output, lacking the necessary content
to do so.141
The defendant in the case, Micro Star, assembled on compact
disc collections of the user-created files and marketed the disc
without the authorization of either FormGen or of the users who
developed the files.142 The user-created files, having been tacitly,
if not explicitly, authorized by FormGen were presumably original
works of authorship, for which the users would hold copyright and
for which they might have a claim against Micro Star for
infringing reproduction and distribution of the files.143 But suit
was brought by FormGen, which had not created the files.144 This
raised the question as to whether Micro Star had taken any of
If none of FormGen’s
FormGen’s original expression.145
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145

See id. at 1109.
Id.
See id. at 1110.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1109.
See id.
Id.
See id.
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expression were found in the files, FormGen had no infringement
claim.146
FormGen claimed that the taken MAP files constituted
derivative works that contained protected expression, giving them
standing to sue.147 In response, Micro Star argued that the copied
and distributed MAP files failed the requirements of a derivative
work, that they incorporated no protected expression, and did not
constitute any concrete or permanent alteration to the FormGen’s
original expression in the game.148 Micro Star’s arguments hinged
upon the MAP files comprising only instructions for assembling an
audiovisual display, without incorporating any of Formgen’s
content. The characters, objects, and other graphics of the game
were contained in the separate game library that was not copied or
distributed by Micro Star, and which was unaltered by the MAP
files.149
The appellate opinion authored by Judge Kozynski rejected this
line of argument by reasoning somewhat circularly first, that the
MAP files were permanent and concrete instantiation of a
derivative work because they fully described an infringing
audiovisual output.150 Analogizing the MAP files to sheet music,
which Kozynski claimed similarly “describes” a musical
composition, the court reasoned that a description of a derivative
work is equivalent to a derivative work.151 The court further held
that the MAP files incorporated protected expression as a sort of
narrative; because the MAP files dictated the placement and
sequence of the Duke Nukem characters, the MAP files therefore
constituted a “story” about the FormGen game characters.152
Relying on the early video game cases, Kozynski’s opinon reasons
that the alternate game levels were derivative works of FormGen’s
Duke Nukem story, and that by “describing” the placement and
arrangement of the graphics in those derivative works, the MAP

146
147
148
149
150
151
152

See id.
Id. at 1110.
See id. at 1112.
See id.
Id. at 1111–12.
Id. at 1112.
See id.
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files constituted in effect the plot, the sequence, and the narrative
of those derivative works.
The result in Micro Star might be read to imply that a relational
database constitutes a copy of the work that it maps, since the court
characterized the question presented as “whether an exact, down to
the last detail, description of an audiovisual display” constituted a
permanent fixation of a derivative work.153 Although this question
is not exactly the question presented by the Google Book Search
database, the questions are clearly closely related. In Judge
Kozynski’s words, the Google database comprises “an exact, down
to the last detail description” of texts scanned into the database.154
If instructions for re-arranging copyrighted elements into a
derivative work constitute a permanent and concrete instantiation
of the initial work, then instructions for re-assembling elements
into the exact arrangement of a copyrighted work might be seen to
constitute a copy of the initial work.155
But it is unclear how far the logic of the opinion can be
extended, as even on its own terms the logic of the opinion is more
than a little dubious. To begin with, the premise that the opinion
relies upon is by definition flawed—the MAP files were not, as the
court claimed, an exact description of an audiovisual display down
to the last detail description; had they been, there would have been
no need for the game graphics library.156 The MAP files were
instructions on the placement and arrangement of data objects
drawn from the graphics library, but those instructions would be
agnostic as to exactly which images were so arranged. One could
imagine substituting a different graphics library, perhaps of Disney
cartoon characters, or even caricatures of federal judges, for the
FormGen graphics library.157 So long as the files in such graphic
libraries were labeled with the same designators as those in the
FormGen library, the images could be “called” in place of the
Duke Nukem files, and a narrative devoid of any FormGen would

153
154
155
156
157

Id. at 1111–12.
Id. at 1111.
See id. at 1112.
See id. at 1111–12.
See generally id. at 1112.
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be generated.158 The point is, of course, that the MAP files
contained no distinctive “story” regarding Duke Nukem unless
paired with the content of the FormGen graphics library.
Kozynski’s comparison of the MAP files to sheet music, as
instructions to produce a copyrighted work, fails for similar
reasons. Sheet music seldom offers a staff and time signature
leaving the performer to fill in the actual notes to be played, nor for
that matter does it merely offer instructions on how to assemble the
score from a musical library such as “insert third note of the
Mozart Requiem,” “insert twelfth note of the J.S. Bach Minuet in
G,” and so on.159 Similarly, if the MAP files constituted detailed
instructions about a derivative work, then it seems dubious that
they could constitute a derivative work. On Kozynski’s logic, a
book of instructions on how to compose a book about Duke
Nukem would itself qualify as a derivative work.160 The problem
with this conclusion seems clear from the court’s comparison of
MAP files to “paint by number” instructions—the result of
painting by numbers might be infringing a copyrighted work, but it
seems inconceivable that instructions such as “paint the spaces
with the number 2 red” could be said to have copied any original
expression from such work.161 Such instructions might perhaps
constitute some sort of inducement to infringement, but that is
another claim entirely.
COPYRIGHT AND METADATA
Although the Google project is novel in scope and vision,
digitized works have been the subject of copyright controversy for
well over a quarter century, so that previous cases offer some
suggestion as to how Google’s meta-database should be
regarded.162 The precedent that seems most relevant to the status
of the Google database may appear to point in different

158
159
160
161
162

Id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1110.
See, e.g., id. at 1107.
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directions.163 Taken on their own, the early videogame cases seem
to suggest that the form of digital fixation is itself irrelevant: so
long as the copyrighted work can be re-generated as output from
the circuits of a machine, it doesn’t matter what kind of coding or
instructions one would find at the machine level.164 This in turn
seems to indicate that the set of instructions, or metadata,
necessary to re-construct a copyrighted work itself constitutes an
infringing copy of the work—that the metadata describing a work
reproduces the originality in the work. The Micro Star holding
appears somewhat consistent with the results in the early
videogame cases, although it also appears to be inconsistent with
the results in Tasini and West. An examination of the MAP files in
Micro Star would not only fail to reveal the physical relational
structure sought by the courts in Tasini and West, but would fail to
find any representation whatsoever of the graphics displayed by
the game output, as such graphics resided in the game library.165
But careful consideration of the inapposite analogies in the
Micro Star opinion also makes clear that this result is not
altogether sensible and that instructions leading to a particular
selection and arrangement are necessarily equivalent to selection
and arrangement itself.166 Certainly this would not be the result if
considering written instructions to a human, rather than coded
instructions to a machine—if, for example, an art expert
meticulously examined a famous painting and then wrote out
detailed instructions re-creating the painting, brush stroke by brush
stroke, it seems fairly clear that such instructions would not be
considered to constitute a copy of the initial painting.167 The same
would surely be true if the instructions were implemented by a
machine; if a copyist developed a mechanical painting arm and
programmed it to reproduce in fine detail the brush strokes of a
painting, even if the product of the mechanical arm constituted a
copy of the initial painting, the program instructing the movements
of the mechanical arm would not be a copy. Such instructions
163
164
165
166
167

See id.
See id.
See id.; N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001).
See Micro Star, 154 F.3d at 1111–12.
See id. at 1112.
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might themselves warrant copyright protection, although that
protection would likely be minimal, since the underlying process is
excluded from copyright protection, and only whatever creativity
might be found in the expression of the instructions could be
covered by copyright. But the copyright in the instructions would
clearly not cover the result of following the instructions.168
Other recent cases dealing with digitized hardcopy works tend
to hold that when individual uncopyrightable elements of a
copyrighted work are stored electronically so as to disrupt the
relationship found between them in the original work, no copy has
been made.169 Although decided in the context of a very specific
statutory provision—§ 201—the reasoning in Tasini170 suggests
that digital versions of hardcopy materials do not infringe
copyright in the hardcopy text due to the disaggregation that occurs
in digital storage and retrieval.171 Neither did the Supreme Court
view user-initiated reassembly of the hardcopy sequence as
infringement, due to the disaggregated nature of the database from
which the user was working. The presence of metadata sufficient
to reassemble the original texts did not change this view. This
tends to suggest that neither the Google database of disaggregated
book text nor the meta-database of book text relationships should
be viewed as infringing copies of the books.172
Much as in the Tasini decision, the analysis in West suggests
that neither disaggregated digitized text nor relational metadata
regarding that text constitute a copy of the original text for
purposes of the copyright statute.173 But the reasoning in the West
decision bears even more directly upon the Google situation, as
this analysis is not through the lens of § 201 republication. Unlike
the databases in Tasini and West, the Google Book Search database
does not maintain the works scanned into it as discrete retrievable

168

See id. at 1111–12.
See generally Tasini, 533 U.S. 483.
170
Id.
171
See id. at 503–04.
172
See id. at 504.
173
See Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. v. West Publ’g Co. (West), 158 F.3d 693, 703–04
(1998).
169
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works, but atomizes them to the level of individual words.174 And
far from assembling individually copyrightable images into what
Judge Kozynski might consider “narrative,” the largest chunk
available to the Google end user is a snippet of a few dozen
words.175 Consequently, the Google database resembles its
original texts even less than did the databases in Tasini and West,
and seems even less likely to constitute and infringing copy.
The analysis in these cases demarcates a general set of
concerns for not only the Google project, but for digital copyright
generally. Although the law of copyright was developed in an
analog world, creative works of all kinds are now captured as
series of sequences of bits rather than as analog records.176 This
change in the fixation of works has several consequences that are
problematic for the basic doctrines of copyright.177 Most of these
consequences flow from the fungible nature of bits. Previous
analog media typically encoded different types of works in
different formats—motion pictures were not recorded as grooves in
vinyl; musical compositions were not recorded as grains of silver
nitrate on celluloid. But digitized music or software or text are all
just sequences of bits, not anything that can as encoded be
differentiated as pictures or music or text.178 Data processors make
no distinction between bits that represent a photograph or painting
or a piece of music or a piece of text, or for that matter between
bits representing a copyrightable work and bits representing
something uncopyrightable, such as a Fourier transform series.179
Because digital records use this common building block of the
bit, it is possible to arrange that common building block into all
kinds of copyrightable works. In this sense, digital media turns
everything—all kinds of copyrightable works—into databases, into

174

See How does Google Book Search work?, Google Book Search Help Center,
http://books.google.com/support/bin/answer.py?answer=43724&topic=9259 (last visited
Jan. 15, 2008).
175
See id.
176
See Dan L. Burk, Expression, Selection, Abstraction: Copyright’s Golden Braid, 55
SYRACUSE L. REV. 593, 594 (2005).
177
See id.
178
See id. at 611.
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See id.
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compilations of fungible elements.180 Everything is reducible to
discrete elements, none of which are individually original.181 This
in turn means that there must necessarily be some type of
metadata, some type of organizational instruction, as to the manner
in which the bits are to be reassembled.182 And it is at this level
that the original expression necessary for copyright protection must
reside, in the manner in which the bits have been arranged to
encode music or text or graphics.183 There is nothing original in
any of the individual bits that can be read to constitute a
photograph or text or musical composition. The originality lies not
in the components, the bits of information, but in the way that the
bits of information are arranged
Such atomistic reduction of copyrighted works to fungible
units may not necessarily be the product of digital technologies;
previous media show the same characteristics to some degree.184
For example, it is possible to view print media as an arrangement
of individual letters from the alphabet into words, and at the next
level of organization, as an arrangement of individual words into a
novel, play, or poem. This reductionist view presents the same
doctrinal problem: surely the letter “A” is not of itself protectable
in copyright, nor is the letter “B,” nor are individual words.185 The
only original aspect of the work must be the author’s selection and
arrangement of the words and letters. The same is true in the case
of other copyrightable works, such as a musical composition or an
Impressionist painting. No individual dab of paint or musical note
will entail the requisite originality for copyright. Rather, the
arrangement of the dabs of paint, the arrangement of individual
notes, structured to communicate a particular idea, is original.
Thus, the essence of copyright seems to lie in original selection
and arrangement of fungible elements.186 Digitization makes this
result more apparent because it facilitates the disaggregation of
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individual elements.187 Although this principle could be applied to
previous analog or physical types of media, it was largely a matter
of academic or philosophical speculation—an exercise in
determining how many works of original authorship could dance
on the head of a pin. But the issue is now unavoidable, and therein
lies the paradox for copyright doctrine: copyrightable selection and
arrangement cannot exist in a vacuum; there must be selection and
arrangement of something.188 This seems to be the message of the
Tasini and West decisions. Relational metadata, as generated in
Tasini or West or in the Google Book Search database, is a
description of the selection and arrangement of atomistic elements
in the work described, but cannot itself be a copy of the work,
because the metadata does not incorporate the atomized elements
of the work.189
This is presumably good news for the Google project, as it
argues powerfully against its disaggregated textual database
constituting an infringing copy, quite apart from an analysis of fair
use. But this reductionist conclusion also in some sense places
copyright doctrine on a collision course with itself. If no
individual bit of data warrants copyright protection, and the
metadata used to arrange such bits also fails the criteria for
copyright, then it is unclear which digital content might warrant
copyright protection. Indeed, this outcome implies that the Google
metadatabase itself, for all the investment that has gone into it, is
no more eligible for copyright protection than any other digital
work in the database of databases that comprises the emerging
global information structure.
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